encompasses and sustains history also became a uniquely single point
in history as one man, savior of the world.

Christ Our Center
Joseph Ratzinger’s Witness1
Edward T. Oakes, S. J.
Abstract: The author first traces the rise of today’s postmodernism
from nineteenth-century relativism, both of which reject claims to the
possession of an absolute and universal truth. They see such a claim as
an imposition of one’s own limited perspective on others. This phenomenon rules out Christ as the center of history. He then notes that for
him ecumenism is not just for unity in the church but for a united claim
to the centrality and lordship of Christ over the universe. He pursues
this line of thought through the Christology of Cardinal Ratzinger before he became Pope Benedict XVI. He explores Ratzinger’s critique of
Marxist-tinged theology as it pertains to pluralistic theology. Namely,
both relativize the subjects they address. So the issue is how Christians
of different churches can proclaim Christ as the single and universal
savior of the human race. This is the task for ecumenical discussion. The
goal is to reaffirm together the creedal statement that the Logos that
1. Books and Culture first published a version of this article in their September/October 2013 issue.
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et me begin by quoting from the teachings of the Second
Vatican Council, a passage that I think can explain why we
are here for these conversations:

Catholics must joyfully acknowledge and esteem the truly
Christian endowments from our common heritage which
are to be found among our separated brethren. It is right
and salutary to recognize the riches of Christ and virtuous works in the lives of others who are bearing witness to
Christ, sometimes even to the shedding of their blood. . . .
Nor should we forget that whatever is wrought by the grace
of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of our separated brethren
can contribute to our own edification. Whatever is truly
Christian never conflicts with the genuine interests of the
faith; indeed, it can always result in the more ample realization of the very mystery of Christ and the Church.2

Of course, when this teaching was promulgated in 1965, nearly
all Christian churches affirmed the centrality of Christ. Indeed, the
World Council of Churches made it a condition of membership
that the applicant church or denomination affirm both the lordship of Christ and an official belief in the Triune God. But in the
intervening years, the centrality of Christ to the realization of the
salvation of the world has come to be called into question across a
2. Unitatis redintegratio, no. 4.
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wide spectrum of liberal church bodies and by liberal Christians in
general, including by some Catholic theologians.
Largely under the influence of something called postmodernism, itself largely the result of the massive influence of Friedrich
Nietzsche, claims to the possession of a universal truth have now
come to be seen as a hegemonic imposition of one’s particular
and entirely limited perspective on cultures and worldviews that
do not share that view of the truth. Accordingly, any universal
claim to the “truth”—whether it be scientific, philosophical, or
religious truth—is almost automatically met with skepticism, and
even derision.
Although attacks on the Christocentrism of the New Testament became a force to be reckoned with only after Vatican II
(at least in the Catholic Church), the roots of the problem well
antedate Nietzsche and can even be plausibly located with the
victory of the Copernican worldview in the seventeenth century.
Even though Nicholas Copernicus himself certainly held to the
centrality of the solar system in the circumscribed world of his
own frankly medieval universe, the eventual overthrow of geocentrism led to what astronomers now call the Copernican Principle,
which might be colloquially described in these words: “We’re not
that special, so get over it.” Thus, even the whole question of extraterrestrial intelligence on other planets within our galaxy (not
to mention in the billions of other galaxies, which are probably
forever beyond our ken) inevitably raises Christological questions.
The nineteenth century brought a whole new challenge, first
from history and then from the other social sciences, especially
ethnography and comparative religion. The eighteenth-century
rationalist Benedict Spinoza had already adumbrated the problem
in regard to the Hebrew Bible; but perhaps the person who put
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the matter most acutely in regard to the New Testament was the
late-nineteenth-century theologian Ernst Troeltsch. In a shrewd
remark, he once compared Christocentrism in theology to geocentrism in astronomy:
[Historical contingency] also seems to make this conclusion
impossible—calling the Christian community the eternal
absolute center of salvation for the whole span of humanity. . . . Man’s age upon earth amounts to several hundred
thousand years or more. His future may come to still more.
It is hard to imagine a single point of history along this
time—and, as it just so happens, this midpoint of our own
religious history—as the sole center of all humanity. That
looks far too much like the absolutizing of our own contingent area of life. That would be in religion what geocentrism
and anthropocentrism are in cosmology and metaphysics,
respectively. The whole logic of Christocentrism places it
with these other centrisms.3
Of course, if one asks how a radical historicist and relativist
like Troeltsch can get the wherewithal to make such an “absolutist” statement ruling out Christ as the midpoint of history from
the outset, he has his answer to that too: he grants the point! He
freely admits that all statements about history, including his own,
are always probabilistic: “Of course,” he says, “nothing certain can
be said here, but it [Christocentrism] is not probable.”4
3. Ernst Troeltsch, “The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith,”
in Ernst Troeltsch: Writings on Theology and Religion, trans. Robert Morgan and Michael Pye (Louisville, Ky.: John Knox, 1927), 189.
4. Ibid.
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Such is our situation and constitutes the central reason I consider the Catholic-Evangelical dialogue so important: not just for
the central ecumenical reason that Christ wills unity for his Church
but also because only here can Christians address Troeltsch’s dilemma without first abandoning the very Christocentrism that is
at issue. In other words, I am convinced that this problem can only
be solved if Christians first hold to the centrality and lordship of
Christ over the universe and then address Troeltsch’s challenge in
terms of Christocentrism.
In the rest of what follows, I want to outline the witness of
Joseph Ratzinger, not only because he has thought so long and
hard about this but also because I am convinced that his efforts
to fashion a Christocentric Christology will prove to be one of his
lasting contributions.5 As every physician knows, a hopeful prognosis depends on an accurate diagnosis. So how does Joseph Ratzinger diagnose this now burning issue in the church?
First, like any good physician, he must determine how far relativism has extended its ideology into the body of the church and
to what extent it poses a danger. Perhaps this might surprise the
untutored, but Ratzinger does not condemn all forms of relativism tout court. Like bacteria in the body, which is both essential
to metabolism in some forms and dangerous in others, there is a
salubrious kind of relativism and a toxic form. For just as bacteria
are necessary for digestion, so too certain forms of relativism can
serve as an antidote to absolutism, an acid that eats away at dangerous versions of absolutist dictatorships.
5. I shall be calling him throughout “Joseph Ratzinger,” not just because he is no
longer pope but also because I shall be quoting throughout works written by him
before his election to the papacy.
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In an important address to the heads of doctrinal commissions
for the various bishops’s conferences in Latin America in 1996, the
future pope pointed out that the greatest challenge for the Catholic Church in the immediate postconciliar years was the claim
of liberation theology to represent an authentic translation of the
gospel message. Although the Bavarian cardinal was not entirely
critical of liberation theology, he certainly saw a problem in those
versions of it that uncritically drew on Marxism, which suddenly
faced a crisis when the communist polities of Eastern Europe fell
in 1989:
The fall of the European governmental systems based on
Marxism turned out to be a kind of twilight of the gods
for that theology of redeeming political praxis. Precisely in
those places where the Marxist liberating ideology had been
applied consistently, a radical lack of freedom had been
produced, the horror of which now appeared out in the open
before the eyes of world public opinion. The fact is that
when politics are used to bring redemption, they promise
too much. When they presume to do God’s work, they
become not divine but diabolical.6
6. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today;
Address to the Presidents of the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops’ Conferences
of Latin America, Delivered in Guadalajara, Mexico, May 1996,” in The Essential
Pope Benedict XVI: His Central Writings and Speeches, edited by John F. Thornton and
Susan B. Varenne (New York: HarperOne, 2007), 228: cited henceforth as Ratzinger,
“Relativism.” A revised version of this talk was also published as “The New Questions
that Arose in the Nineties: The Position of Faith and Theology Today,” in Truth and
Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, trans.
Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004); cited henceforth as Ratzinger,
Tolerance. I shall throughout be quoting from the original address.
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Having recovered from—or at least having come to realize—
the damage caused by the communist illusion, public opinion and
political thought reacted by shying away from claims to absolutism, a shift that Cardinal Ratzinger applauds, at least provisionally:
In turn, relativism appears to be the philosophical foundation of democracy. Democracy, in fact, is supposedly built
on the basis that no one can presume to know the true way,
and it is enriched by the fact that all roads are mutually
recognized as fragments of the effort toward that which
is better. . . . A system of freedom ought to be essentially
a system of positions that are connected with one another
because they are relative, as well as being dependent on
historical situations open to new developments. Therefore,
a liberal society would be a relativist society: only with that
condition could it continue to be free and open to the future.
In the area of politics, this concept is considerably right. There
is no one correct political opinion. What is relative—the
building up of liberally ordained coexistence between
people—cannot be absolute. Thinking in this way was precisely the error of Marxism and the political theologies.7
Thus, there can be a legitimate pluralism on the mediate question
of politics. But that concession to a legitimate relativism can hardly
be the last word. Politics is, after all, concerned with justice. There
might be a legitimate pluralism in mediate questions, but ultimate
questions are not so easily relativized: “There are injustices,” says
Ratzinger, “that will never turn into something just . . . while, at
7. Ratzinger, “Relativism,” 229; emphasis added.
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the same time, there are just things that can never be unjust.”8 So,
the question becomes, as he says, “setting limits” to relativism.
The first place where relativism must be kept at bay for the
cardinal—and it is crucial that this is the first item on his list—is
in Christology.9 For him any type of relativism in Christology will
inevitably lead to its attenuation. I presume we are all familiar with
the passage early in his book Introduction to Christianity where
he compares the situation in theology to the folk tale told by the
Brothers Grimm about “lucky Hans” who traded a lump of gold
he stumbled upon for, in turn, a horse, a cow, a goose, and finally a
whetstone, which he then threw away as a valueless encumbrance.
Such is the consequence of relativism in Christology, he says:
The worried Christian of today is often bothered by questions like these: has our theology in the last few years not
taken in many ways a similar path? Has it not gradually
watered down the demands of faith, which had been
found all too demanding, always only so little that nothing
important seemed to be lost, yet always so much that it was
soon possible to venture on to the next step? And will poor
Hans, the Christian who trustfully let himself be led from
exchange to exchange, from interpretation to interpretation,
not really soon hold in his hand, instead of the gold with

8. Ibid.
9. It is the thesis of Emery de Gaál, in The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) that Pope Benedict has sought to resolve all theological
disputes, in both the pre-and post-conciliar church, from the nature-grace relationship and the nature of the liturgy to the challenge of historical criticism and relativism
in Christological terms.
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which he began, only a whetstone, which he can be confidently recommended to throw away?10

of the medieval disputation. I am reminded in this context of an
observation from Josef Pieper:

Ratzinger shrewdly notes that, despite their formal differences,
the loud cries for a relativistic Christology now occupy the same
ideological space once taken by liberation theologians—and some
of the latter have moved seamlessly into becoming advocates of
the former. This swift segue from a Marxist-tinged theology to
a relativizing one is, to be sure, not without its ironies, since one
of the objections raised against Christocentrism by the pluralists
is that it leads to fanaticism and particularism—themselves the
besetting sins of communists. Still, the relativizers are not without
their absolutes (no surprise there, since everyone is an absolutist
about something), and never more so than in their command to dissolve absolutist claims on behalf of Christ:

Thomas succeeds not only in presenting the opponent’s
divergent or flatly opposed opinion, together with the
underlying line of reasoning, but also, many times, in presenting it better, more clearly, and more convincingly than
the opponent himself might be able to do. In this procedure
there emerges an element profoundly characteristic of
St. Thomas’s intellectual style: the spirit of the disputatio,
of disciplined opposition; the spirit of genuine discussion
which remains a dialogue even while it is a dispute.12

This same contradiction lurks in their call to “dialogue.” Of
course dialogue is an important value in relation to the plurality
of religions and has long had, moreover, an honored place in both
philosophy and theology, as we know from Plato and from the art

But nowadays the call to dialogue in the relativist creed operates in a different ecology and has become an ultimate value. Both
Plato and the medievals assumed without further ado that dialogue always aimed at the truth. Indeed Thomas could be so fair to
his opponent and so serene in presenting opposing views precisely
because he was so confident that dialogue was but the initiating
moment leading to the terminating goal of truth. But once the
relativist gives up the notion of truth as an ideal and sees it only
as the hegemonic imposition of an opponent’s will to power, then
dialogue becomes an end in itself.
Note again the irony of the hidden absolutism lurking here in
the insistence that dialogue is the ultimate value before which all
other claims must be sacrificed. But leaving aside this internal self-
contradiction of the relativists, how is someone like Troeltsch to

10. Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 2004/1968), 31; cited hereafter as “Ratzinger, Introduction.”
11. Ratzinger, Relativism, 231; emphasis added.

12. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 77–78.

The relativist dissolution of Christology, and even more of
ecclesiology, thus becomes a central commandment of religion. To return to Hick’s thinking, faith in the divinity of
one concrete person, as he tells us, leads to fanaticism and
particularism, to the dissociation between faith and love,
and it is precisely this which must be overcome.11
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be answered, who freely admitted that his critique of an absolutist
Christocentrism was merely probable? How do we answer Rousseau’s observation that religion is geographically specific, tied to
specific cultures not easily transferable to other cultures that operate under different presuppositions? How can the genuine value
of dialogue be preserved while also maintaining the church’s consistently held view that Christ is the single and universal savior of
the human race?
Here again, we find a move by the future pope that might
surprise both his admirers and his critics. For he rejects the Enlightenment claim that reason can serve as the Great Adjudicator. Indeed, he seems to agree with the postmodernists in at least
this point (which they hammer away at consistently): that reason
is always historically situated. “For human reason is not autonomous in the absolute,” says the cardinal: “It is always found in a
historical context. The historical context disfigures its vision. . . .
Therefore, it also needs historical assistance to help it cross over its
historical barriers.”13
Remarkably, Ratzinger also concedes that this Enlightenment
claim for the absolute validity of universal reason was the besetting error of neo-scholasticism. In a passage that shows he was no
unthinking revanchist, the future pope openly asserts:
I am of the opinion that the neo-Scholastic rationalism
failed because—with reason totally independent from
faith—it tried to reconstruct the praeambula fidei with pure
rational certainty. All attempts that presume to do the same
will have the same result. Yes, Karl Barth was right to reject
13. Ratzinger, Relativism, 239.
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philosophy as a foundation of the faith independent from
the faith.14
While Ratzinger is by no means a Barthian across the board,
he does insist with Barth that Christology must establish its own
norms for rationality; for taken in terms of worldly logic, the
doctrine of Christ will always be couched in the logic of paradox. This is because reason is both a universal endowment in that
being Aristotle defines precisely as a rational animal and is also
the human faculty that gives access to the inherent rationality of a
structured universe.15 But Christianity proclaims something revolutionary about that universal Logos, that it is entirely incarnate in
but one man, Jesus Christ: “For in him the fullness of the godhead
was pleased to dwell” (Col. 1:19), the acceptance of which claim
leads to the overthrow of worldly logic:
It is only in the second section of the Creed that we come
up against the real difficulty . . . about Christianity: the profession of faith that the man Jesus, an individual executed in
Palestine about the year 30, the Christus (anointed, chosen)
of God, indeed God’s own Son, is the central and decisive
point of all human history. It seems both presumptuous
and foolish to assert that one single figure who is bound to
disappear farther and farther into the mists of the past is
14. Ibid., 231; emphasis added.
15. Isaac Newton’s law of gravity is of course, mathematically, a ratio—not accidentally also the Latin word for reason. No wonder, then, that later historians retrospectively call Newton’s century the “Age of Reason,” even though that century also
witnessed the Thirty Years’ War and such outbreaks of irrationality as the persecution
of alleged “witches.”
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the authoritative center of all history. Although faith in the
logos, the meaningfulness of being, corresponds perfectly
with a tendency in the human reason, this second article
of the Creed proclaims the absolutely staggering alliance
of logos and sarx, of meaning and a single historical figure.
The meaning that sustains all being has become flesh; that is, it
has entered history and become one individual in it; it is no
longer simply what encompasses and sustains history but is
a point in it.16
To accept this claim entails an important methodological
consideration, one that must overthrow the usual philosophical
approach to reality, which seeks out universal patterns, whereas
Christianity absolutizes one moment in history:
Accordingly the meaning of all being is first of all no longer
to be found in the sweep of mind that rises above the individual, the limited, into the universal; it is no longer simply
given in the world of ideas, which transcends the individual
and is reflected in it only in a fragmentary fashion; it is to be
found in the midst of time, in the countenance of one man.17
These assertions by no means make Ratzinger a fideist, still less
an irrationalist. Indeed, in his commentary on the first section of
the creed (“I believe in God”), Ratzinger stressed a key motif that
runs through all his writings: the harmony between faith and reason, between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers.

Nonetheless, and even with that point conceded, a union of faith
and history is for him ultimately based on the union of word and
flesh, which of course is much harder for the human intellect to
grasp and then to accept.
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16. Ratzinger, Introduction, p. 193; Latin and Greek terms italicized by Ratzinger (or
at least the translator); other emphases added.
17. Ibid., 193–94.
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